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The paper empirically examines three possible reasons for the high and rising unemployment 
of low-skilled employees in Germany: (i) an upsurge in interindustry trade, (ii) a skill-biased 
technical change, and (iii) a failure of labour market adjustment. The empirical analyses 
indicate that an exogenous wage-setting process as well as a bundle of factors, including a 
skill-biased technical and structural change, have contributed to the decline in relative demand 
for low-skilled employees in Germany. Thus, economic policy in Germany should focus on 
improving the employability of workers in the lower segment of the labour market and on 
raising the adjustment flexibility, above all the flexibility of the wage structure, of the German 
labour market. 
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Trade, Technical Change, and Labour Market Adjustment 
1.  The Problem 
Starting with the oil price shock in 1974, the unemployment rate in Germany has markedly 
increased during each recession. In each of the following upswings, the unemployment rate 
fell slightly, but did not return to its prerecession level. As a result, the unemployment rate 
had been ratcheting upwards from 0.6 percent in 1970 to an all-time high of 11.4 percent in 
1997. Remarkably, since the beginning of the 1980s the unemployment rate among the 
unskilled has been considerably higher than the unemployment rates for the skilled and high-
skilled. What is more, while the three skill-specific unemployment rates moved in a parallel 
fashion during the 1980s, the unskilled unemployment rate rose much faster than the rates for 
the skilled and high-skilled after 1990 and tripled from 7 percent in 1991 to 21 percent in 
1997. 
Looking for the reasons for the relatively high and rising unemployment rate among the 
unskilled, three more or less parallel trends attract attention. Firstly, the share of imports from 
developing and newly industrialized countries in total German imports rose from 15.9 percent 
in 1980 to 22.8 percent in 2001. Thus, with a view to the rigid wage structure in Germany it 
could be assumed that a fall in relative prices for labour-intensive goods has contributed to the 
high unemployment rate of unskilled employees. Secondly, the share of unskilled in total 
workers in Germany has declined by 1.1 percent per year during the period 1984–1997 
(Schimmelpfennig 2000, p.14). It is remarkable that this trend is not solely the result of 
structural change in some labour-intensive sectors of the German economy, but holds across 
all sectors of the German economy, except for energy and transportation. This trend supports 
the assumption that a skill-biased technical change could at least partially be responsible for 
the high and rising unemployment rate of the unskilled. Thirdly, the wage differential between   2
high-skilled and unskilled employees as well as between skilled and unskilled employees 
have both fallen slightly from 1984 to 1995 (Christensen and Schimmelpfennig 1998). Thus, 
relative wages of the unskilled have not only not reacted to possible trade and technology 
shocks but also seem to be determined by factors turning them at least to some extent into 
exogenous determinants of relative labour demand. The special mechanism of wage 
bargaining, the unemployment insurance system as well as the social benefits system in 
Germany could be institutional factors that result in an exogenous wage setting process in 
Germany and, therefore, could be partly responsible for the declining demand for low-skilled 
employees. 
The objective of this paper is to empirically examine the strength of these hypotheses in 
explaining the relatively low and falling demand for low-skilled employees in Germany. After 
some theoretical considerations (section 2), section 3 presents the empirical evidence. Section 
4 draws some policy conclusions. 
2.  Theoretical Considerations 
a. Interindustry Trade and Employment 
The coincidence between a decreasing demand for low-skilled employees and increasing 
imports of labour-intensive manufacturing goods from developing countries has raised a 
lively debate on the economic effects of interindustry trade between industrial and developing 
countries. This debate centres on the question, if and to what extent the deepening of the 
interindustrial division of labour between developing and industrial countries is indeed 
responsible for falling real wages or growing unemployment of low-skilled employees in 
industrial countries. Authors who are sceptical with regard to the trade hypothesis claim that it 
is not trade but a skill-biased technical change what drives the skill composition of the labour 
force in industrial economies. With a view to the empirical results of this debate, the turning   3
of the scale seems to be – at least with respect to the United States – in favour of the 
technology hypothesis.1 However, for Germany the results are not as straight forward as for 
the United States. Although the few empirical studies on the employment effects of 
interindustry trade give some hints that trade is not the major culprit of the piece, the 
empirical picture is still relatively blurred.2 
Although there is doubt about the empirical validity of the trade hypothesis, there exists a 
wide consensus that the causal relationship between the demand for low-skilled employees 
and the upsurge in interindustry trade is to be analysed in the theoretical framework of a 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model. In this theoretical framework, the deepening of trade 
integration between developing and industrialized countries can be modelled as a shift from 
autarky to free trade. It is assumed that a typical industrial economy can be characterized by 
two factors of production, low-skilled and high-skilled employees, and two sectors, producing 
human capital intensive (Q1) and labour-intensive (Q2) goods respectively. Moreover, it is 
realistically assumed that in industrial countries like Germany human capital is the abundant 
factor, whereas less developed countries are relatively well endowed with low-skilled 
employees. 
In Figure 1, the possible combinations of human capital intensive (Q1) and labour-intensive 
goods (Q2) that can be produced in the industrial country are given by the transformation 
curve T. In autarky, the equilibrium is established at A, where the indifference curve I1 is 
tangent to the transformation curve. The relative prices of the two goods are given by the 
__________ 
1   See among others, Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), 
Berman et al. (1994), Leamer (1994; 1996), Wood (1995), Baldwin (1994), Krugman (1995), Sachs and Shatz 
(1996), Davis (1996), Baldwin and Cain (1997). An overview of the debate is provided in Richardson (1995), 
OECD (1997), and Stehn (2000). 
2   For an overview of the German empirical literature see Siebert and Stehn (1999).   4
slope of the price curve P1. A trade integration with labour-intensive economies increases the 
supply of labour-intensive goods and, therefore, reduces the relative price of these goods in 
the domestic market. The price curve shifts from P1 to P2. As a consequence of the change in 
relative prices, the human capital abundant industrial economy specializes in human capital 
intensive goods; the production point moves from A to B and the new consumption point is 
given by C. 
The welfare gains from trade liberalization go hand in hand with a income redistribution in 
human capital intensive economies. The relative increase in prices for human capital intensive 
goods leads to an expansion of the human capital intensive goods producing sector, whereas 
the labour-intensive sector shrinks. As a consequence, the relative demand for low-skilled 
employees falls and in the new equilibrium full employment can only be attained if the 
relative wages of low-skilled employees fall accordingly (Stolper-Samuelson-Theorem). In 
case of a rigidity of the relative wage structure, i.e. in the German case, unemployment of 
low-skilled persons is the other side of the coin (Krugman 1995). 
This quite simple HOV-model presents a very important message to the empirical 
researcher: An increase in interindustry trade leads to a falling demand for low-skilled 
employees, if, and only if it results in a change of relative goods prices. Indeed, as Richardson 
(1995) has shown in detail, a growth-induced trade expansion that is lifting all boats (a 
parallel shift of the transformation curve in Figure 1 to the northeast) will not result in any 
change of relative goods prices (the slope of the price-curve P1 in Figure 1 stays constant) 
and, therefore, will have no effects on relative factor demand. Thus, to analyze the effects of  
a rise in interindustry trade on relative factor demand, one has to examine the trend in relative 
goods prices.  
To be sure, even the trend in relative goods prices can be misleading if an increase of 
interindustry trade is (coincidently) accompanied by a skill-biased technical change leading to   5
an equal substitution of high-skilled for low-skilled employees in all sectors of an economy 
(see, among others, Baldwin and Cain 1997). As a result of this substitution, low-skilled 
employees will become the relative abundant factor and the production of labour-intensive 
goods will rise relative to the production of human capital intensive goods. If world demand is 
inelastic with respect to changes in the domestic production structure (small country 
assumption), a skill-biased technical change will leave relative world market prices 
unchanged. However, in case of a country that is big enough to influence its terms of trade, a 
skill-biased technical change will alter relative goods prices in the same direction as an 
increase of interindusty trade does. As a consequence, an empirical study that takes changes 
in relative goods prices as a measure will overestimate the trade effects if skill-biased 
technical change is at work at the same time. Although it seems to be a little bit heroic to 
assume that a country like Germany is in a position to influence its terms of trade, this 
potential effect of a skill-biased technical change should be borne in mind when interpreting 
the empirical results. 
b. Technical Change and Employment 
Although skill-biased technical change is a term widely used in the literature, it is usually 
not defined in a precise manner. In general, skill-biased technical change is understood to 
describe a kind of technical change that leads to an increase in the demand for skilled workers 
and a decrease in the demand for low-skilled workers. Some authors see the microelectronic 
revolution at the heart of skill-biased technical change: “… the rapid diffusion of ITC has led 
– and continues to lead – to a substantial exclusion of large parts of the labour force, either 
unskilled or wrongly skilled and incapable of training.” (Freeman et al. 1995: 600). Johnson 
(1997) relates skill-biased technical change to different forms of innovations and distinguishes 
between intensive, extensive and neutral technical change. He defines intensive skill-biased 
technical change as a technical change that makes skilled workers more productive in the jobs   6
they already perform; the introduction of computers is an example. Extensive skill-biased 
technical change is defined as a technical change that leads to the employment of skilled 
workers in jobs that were formerly performed by unskilled workers; automation in 
manufacturing is an example. Technical change is skill-neutral, if it raises the productivity of 
all workers by the same percentage. Also conceivable is the existence of unskilled-biased 
technical change, e.g., the introduction of the assembly line in production. 
Katsoulacos (1986) focuses on two types of innovation: (i) Process innovation decreases 
employment by mainly eliminating jobs for the unskilled, while (ii) product innovation 
increases employment by creating new jobs that often require skilled workers. Both types of 
innovation can appear as skill-biased technical change in the data. However, one should bear 
in mind that product innovation is better described as sectoral structural change, because it 
leads to the rise of new markets. 
Through product innovation, new goods are introduced and old goods fall into oblivion. 
Structural change describes the reallocation of economic activity in response to innovations. 
In particular, structural change describes the reallocation of production factors between 
different uses or between different sectors. In the case of labour supply, slow adjustment to 
changes in labour demand can result in an increase in unemployment. Thus, the distinction 
between skill-biased technical change and sectoral structural change is not as clear-cut as it 
appears on first sight (Schimmelpfennig 2000). While skill-biased technical change will play 
some role in explaining the changing skill composition, in empirical research it is nothing 
more than a residual that could also be interpreted as an indicator of structural change. 
In the empirical literature, there is a wide consensus that skill-biased technical change drives 
the skill composition in industrial economies. The by now almost classic studies were carried 
out for the United States by Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Berman et 
al. (1994), and for a number of OECD countries by Berman et al. (1997). Katz and Murphy   7
(1992), for example, study the skill composition in the United States from 1963 to 1987. They 
find that between-industry changes account for 30 percent of the change in the skill 
composition. Thus, within-industry changes, i.e. skill-biased technical change, explain most 
of the change. 
For Germany, the evidence is not as clear-cut as for the United States. Whereas Falk and 
Koebel (1997) and Steiner and Moch (1997) identify a skill-biased technical change as the 
driving force of skill-composition, Kölling (1998) finds no relationship between technical 
change and relative labour demand. According to the results of Blechinger and Pfeiffer 
(1998), it is rather a move towards technologically more advanced plants that appears to be 
hiding behind the residual skill-biased technical change. Schimmelpfennig (2000) explicitly 
shows that it is a structural change of the production process rather than a skill-biased 
technical change what determines the unemployment duration of low-skilled workers. 
c. Labour Market Adjustment and Employment 
As mentioned above, the wage differentials between high-skilled and unskilled employees 
as well as between skilled and unskilled employees in Germany have both fallen slightly from 
1984 to 1995. The labour market consequences of the resulting wage structure can best be 
illustrated in a Mussa diagram3 (Figure 2). The length of the x-axis equals the stock of the 
labour force in an economy that is assumed to be constant over time and independent of the 
wage level (inelastic labour supply). The labour demand functions for low-skilled and high-
skilled workers are given by the curves D
L and D
H, respectively, where D
H is drawn to the 
origin O*. In the initial period, there is full employment with wage levels of  L w0  and  H w0  for 
__________ 
3   This kind of a diagram was used by Mussa (1974) to explain the impact of tariffs on functional income 
distribution. It was applied, e.g., to analyse the labour market effects of sectoral structural change by Klodt et al. 
(1997).   8
low-skilled and high-skilled employees. The employment of low-skilled workers amounts to 
0x0 that of high-skilled workers to x00*. 
External shocks like an increase in world wide supply of labour-intensive goods or a skill-
biased technical or structural change shifts both demand curves to the left. Given the new 
demand curves  L D1  and  H D1  as well as a short-term factor immobility, full employment for 
both groups of factors can only be attained by an adjustment of wages to  L w1  and  H w1 , 
respectively, resulting in a rising wage differential. However , the German case that is 
characterized by a constant or even falling rather than rising wage differential does not fit into 
this standard textbook picture. Moreover, German employees were able to push for higher 
wages after employment fell in response to negative external shocks (Snower 1997). Thus, 
despite the possible countervailing effects of external shocks, the wage level of low-skilled 
employees rises to  L
G w , that of the high-skilled to  H w1  (assuming a constant wage 
differential). As a consequence,  0 1 x xL  less-skilled employees become unemployed due to a 
wage-setting process that seems to be more or less resistant to market forces.  
There are several reasons for this independency that turns relative wages in Germany into 
exogenous determinants of relative labour demand. Above all, the wage bargaining process in 
Germany is almost a perfect mirror image of those theories of bargaining postulating that 
wages are set not by market forces, but in a bilateral bargaining framework between groups of 
workers with common interests (unions) and individual employers and employers’ 
associations. In Germany, the trade unions and the employers’ associations (the so-called 
“social partner”) have been granted the right to negotiate a collective wage contract relating to 
minimum wages, working time, holidays, fringe benefits, and other aspects of work.4 In 
principle, the contract terms only apply to the contracting parties, although – under a set of 
__________ 
4   See Paqué (1999) for an in-depth analysis of wage bargaining in Germany.   9
exceptional circumstances – the Federal Minister of labour may declare a collective 
agreement generally binding for any branch of industry. Although this is in fact rarely done, 
the mere legal possibility may signal enough threat potential to ward off any attempt of 
outsiders at underbidding. More importantly, however, there are other economic reasons why 
most employees hold jobs at contractual conditions. 
First, the degree of organization (the ‘density rate’) is high especially on the employers’ 
side: about 35–40 percent of dependent-status employees are members of unions, about 80 
percent of all employers are members of employers’ associations. Second, virtually all of 
these organized employers offer the same wage and working conditions to union members 
and non-union members alike, because any unorganised worker employed at subcontractual 
conditions in an organized firm might join the relevant union and thus secure himself the right 
to the conditions of the collective agreement. In turn, the employer is not allowed to dismiss 
the worker on the grounds of his newly acquired union membership, e.g., to enforce an 
individual contract which obliges the worker not to join a union. Hence the only sensible 
economic strategy for any organized employer is to simply grant contractual conditions to 
anybody in the first place. Third, there is a widespread consensus in the public – including the 
press and political parties – that offering wages or working conditions at subcontractual levels 
involves some sort of worker exploitation. Thus, at least prestigious domestic firms which 
have a reputation to lose in public, refrain from openly disregarding collective agreements by 
hiring workers at wages and working conditions below the common contractual minimum in 
the respective industry. 
Moreover, the so-called Günstigkeitsprinzip of the German wage contract law 
(Tarifvertragsgesetz) stipulates that an individual worker who is a union member can deviate 
from the negotiated union wage contract if this is favourable for him. However, “favourable” 
is interpreted in a very narrow sense by the labour courts as a wage higher than the union   10
wage or as less working time. The risk of becoming unemployed or the security of the job can 
not legally be part of the consideration of whether to deviate from the union contract is 
favourable; this has been explicitly decided by the highest German labour court. There is no 
doubt that this limitation of individual choice contributes to the rigidity in the German labour 
market and thus to the low degree of wage differentiation. 
In addition, the unemployment benefit and the social welfare benefit systems are important 
factors that contribute to the resistance of the German wage structure to market forces. The 
unemployment benefit system includes two types of unemployment support. Unemployment 
benefits of type I (Arbeitslosengeld) amount to 67 percent of the previous net income for 
unemployed persons with at least one child (60 percent for singles). The duration of benefits 
varies with age and goes up to 32 months. Unemployment benefits of type II 
(Arbeitslosenhilfe) are set at 57 percent of the previous net income for unemployed persons 
with at least one child (53 percent for singles). This type of benefit is paid for an indefinite 
period of time. Although it is linked to the previous working income, it requires neediness. 
Social welfare benefits (Sozialhilfe) aim at allowing a life in dignity for those who cannot 
make their living by themselves. This includes the elderly without sufficient income and those 
in the working age who are unable to work, who do not find a job and for whom the 
unemployment schemes do not apply. Social welfare benefits are defined by minimum 
requirements for living and are means-tested. For a married worker with one child, the 
benefits make up 68.5 percent of the lowest net wage in industry, 75 percent of wages in craft, 
and 100 percent of wages in low-paid jobs in restaurants and hotels (Boss 2002). 
This set of government-provided incomes has a considerable impact on the wage that an 
unemployed expects from a new job (reservation wage). Empirical studies indicate that the 
reservation wage of unemployed persons in Germany amounts to 120 percent of the previous 
income (Christensen 2001). This is unusually high for someone who is striving to find a new   11
job and it is high in comparison to other countries. What is more, reservation wages in 
Germany do not decline with the duration of unemployment (Christensen 2002). Given the 
special institutional characteristics of wage-bargaining in Germany, it is obvious that neither 
workers nor their unions will accept a wage rate below the reservation wage. As a 
consequence, welfare benefits of the German type define a floor to the wage structure. In 
other words, there exists an implicit minimum wage, without a minimum wage being formally 
defined, that restricts wage differentiation – at least in the lower segment of the labour market 
– to a considerable extent (Siebert 2003). 
3.  Empirical Evidence 
a. Interindustry Trade and Employment 
Since trade theory based on HOV-models identifies changes in relative goods prices as the 
main transmission mechanism between interindustry trade and relative factor demand, an 
empirical analysis of this relationship has to start with an estimation of trends in relative 
goods prices. Official statistics of the German Statistisches Bundesamt provide both, price 
indices for international trade (export and import prices) as well as for production (supplier 
prices and value-added prices). To secure a comprehensive empirical analysis, we estimated 
the time trend of all price indices in 33 industries of the manufacturing sector for the period 
1970–19955. The estimation coefficients, expressed as percentage points per year, are 
presented in Table 1. A positive (negative) coefficient indicates an above (below) average 
price increase in a certain industry compared to the manufacturing industry as a whole. In up 
__________ 
5    Our empirical analysis is confined to the period 1970–1995 because – as a consequence of German 
unification – most data sources on qualification, wages by qualification as well as goods prices provide separate 
data for the ‘old’ West Germany on the one side and the new Bundesländer on the other side only until 1995.   12
to 29 of 33 industries a statistically significant positive or negative price trend can be 
observed. 
As HOV trade theory assumes a negative relationship between labour intensity and the 
relative trend in goods prices, we need an indicator for the skill composition of manufacturing 
industries. The official statistics of the Statistisches Bundesamt on industrial skill composition 
divide white-collar workers into 4 and blue-collar workers into 3 skill categories ranked from 
highest to lowest skills. For our empirical analysis, we have re-structured these 7 categories 
into two skill groups called “low-skilled employees”, including white-collar workers of 
categories 3 and 4 as well as blue-collar workers of categories 2 and 3, and “high-skilled 
employees”, including white-collar workers of categories 1 and 2. The re-structuring shows 
that the share of low-skilled employees in manufacturing as a whole has declined from 56 
percent in 1970 to 40 percent in 1995, whereas the structure of skill composition among 
industries stayed relatively unchanged over time. The latter outcome indicates that the 
substitution of high-skilled for low-skilled employees in Germany is not a sectoral 
phenomenon, but can be observed in almost all manufacturing industries. 
To examine the relationship between labour-intensity and the price trend in manufacturing 
industries, we have plotted the share of low-skilled employees in 1985 against the trend in 
supplier prices (Figure 3). Since the four estimated price trends show a high correlation of up 
to 0.94, it does not make much of a difference to use the one or other price index. We decided 
to plot the trend in supplier prices, because this trend reveals the most significant estimation 
coefficients. In Figure 3, the line DD mirrors the average share of low-skilled employees in 
manufacturing, the vertical line indicates relative price changes of zero. It is obvious that 
there seems to exist no strong relationship between the trend in supplier prices and labour-
intensity. Although there are some labour-intensive industries like textiles that experienced an 
above average decline of prices, the high dispersion of results indicates that there has been no   13
systematic decline of relative prices in labour-intensive industries. In order to back-up this 
result, we have also estimated the partial correlation between the share of low-skilled 
employees in different selected years and the trend in import, export, supplier as well as 
value-added prices (Table 2). As expected, the correlation coefficients are rather low and only 
one coefficient is statistically significant at the (quite weak) 10-percent level.  
Thus, trade integration with developing countries seems to exert no systematic impact on 
relative wages and/or relative employment of low-skilled employees in Germany. Since – 
from a theoretical point of view – a skill-biased technical change would also have a negative 
impact on relative prices of labour-intensive goods, it is impossible that a potential technology 
shock has lead to an underestimation of the trade effect. However, there is some empirical 
evidence that trade protection of German manufacturing industries has at least mitigated the 
effect of interindustry trade on skill composition. Cross-section OLS regressions of effective 
protection in Germany on the share of low-skilled employees indicate that trade barriers in 
manufacturing industries rise with an increasing share of low-skilled employees (Table 3). 
Thus, the empirical evidence presented here leads to the conclusion that the existence of a 
trade shock cannot be ruled out, but that this possible trade shock has had no impact on 
relative goods prices and, therefore, on relative wages and/or relative employment in 
Germany. 
b. Technical Change, Labour Market Adjustment, and Employment 
In contrast to an external trade shock, both a skill-biased technical change as well as an 
exogenous wage-setting process have a direct impact on relative labour demand. Thus, we 
will examine the effects of technical change and labour market adjustment on relative labour 
demand in Germany by estimating a labour demand function that includes indicators for both 
exogenous variables.    14
As the theoretical considerations have shown, the measurement of technical change is a 
dangerous endeavour. Since this paper does not aim at making this endeavour less dangerous, 
we decided to move along the easy way that is never right nor wrong, i.e. to measure technical 
change as the coefficient of the time trend in a neoclassical linear homogeneous production 
function. To do so, we have expressed labour productivity as a logarithmic function of capital 
intensity and a time trend and have estimated this function for 33 manufacturing industries in 
a time-series regression from 1970 to 1995. The estimated coefficient of the time trend is, 
then, supposed to express the autonomous technical change in an industry. This easy way is 
never wrong, since it is well-based on traditional growth theories of the Hicks, Harrod and 
Solow type. It is never right because in empirical research the time trend in a linear 
homogeneous production function is nothing but a residual that captures a bundle of 
determinants that goes well beyond what a serious economist would call technical change. 
However, since we are especially interested in the effects of labour market adjustments on 
relative labour demand, the inclusion of a broadly defined variable representing a bundle of 
exogenous influences helps to properly work out the impact of institutional factors on skill 
composition. 
The estimated labour productivity function is statistically significant at the 1-percent level 
for 31 out of 33 industries and the adjusted R
2 ranges from 0.79 (wood processing) to 0.99 
(electronic products).6 The estimation coefficient for the time trend variable (“technical 
change”) is statistically significant at the 1-percent or 5-percent level in 25 industries. It 
ranges from 12.6 percent a year in dataprocessing and office machines to –4.2 percent a year 
in shipbuilding. The average technical change in manufacturing as a whole amounts to 1.8 
percent a year. 
__________ 
6   The regression equations can be obtained on request from the authors.   15
Official data on wages in different skill categories are again provided by the German 
Statistisches Bundesamt. Figure 4 shows the development of relative wages for low-skilled 
workers, expressed as a percentage share of the wages for high-skilled employees, as well as 
the change in relative employment of low-skilled employees, expressed as a percentage share 
of the employment of high-skilled employees. Whereas the relative employment of the low-
skilled declined from about 200 percent in 1970 to about 120 percent in 1995, relative wages 
for low-skilled employees rose from about 76 percent in 1970 to about 81 percent in 1995 
(Figure 4). 
We have used the data on relative wages for low-skilled employees and the estimated 
coefficients of the time trends in the industry-specific production functions (“technical 
change”) to estimate a labour demand function for the period 1970–1995. Since we are 
pooling time-series and cross-section data, we have to use panel estimation techniques that 
allow us to include the industry-specific trend coefficients as cross-section specific effects in 
the estimation equation. Thus, we have estimated the following demand function: 
ln RELE = fixed effects x cross section specific  effects (technical change) x ln RWLE, 
with RELE: relative employment of low-skilled employees, and RWLE: relative wages of 
low-skilled employees. 
The regression results indicate that both, relative wages for low-skilled employees as well as 
a broadly defined technical change have contributed to the decline in employment of low-
skilled workers in Germany (Table 4).  The estimation coefficients of the cross-section 
specific effects (technical change) have a significant negative sign in 23 out of 30 industries; 
in 5 industries a significant positive impact of technical change on the relative employment of 
low-skilled employees can be observed. The highly significant negative estimation coefficient 
for the wage variable indicates that market forces have not played their textbook role in 
smoothing the impact of external forces on relative labour demand. Obviously, the special   16
mechanisms of wage bargaining as well as the special characteristics of the unemployment 
insurance system and the social aid system in Germany have not only hindered relative wages 
to adjust to external shocks but also turned them into exogenous determinants of relative 
labour demand. 
4.  Policy Conclusions 
The previous sections have shown that an exogenous wage-setting process as well as a 
bundle of factors, including a skill-biased technical and structural change, have contributed to 
the decline in relative demand for low-skilled employees in Germany. What are the policy 
implications of these results? 
If it is indeed a skill-biased technical change or a skill-biased structural change of any kind 
that is mainly hiding behind the time trend in a neoclassical production function, as traditional 
growth theories suggest, our results urge upon improving the employability of workers in the 
lower segment of the labour market as one important task of economic policy. Employability 
crucially depends on having core skills that are demanded in the labour market. If 
requirements concerning these core skills change, e.g., due to technical or structural changes, 
individuals may lose their employability. If they want to regain employability, they have to 
invest in their human capital. Since there is no credit market for education in Germany, there 
may be constraints that lead to an under-investment in employability. An alternative way of 
financing the investment in employability is the reinterpretation of the unemployment 
insurance system as an employability insurance system.7 
Under the new system, an individual who is laid off could take his insurance entitlement and 
use it to finance the investment in human capital necessary to regain his employability. In 
__________ 
7   This proposal that is based on the benefits transfer programs suggested by Snower (1994) and Orszag and 
Snower (1996) has first been made by Schimmelpfennig (2000).   17
Germany, this approach is already adopted to some extent. The labour office (Arbeitsamt) 
provides different training courses available to some registered unemployed. However, the 
present system does not rely on market forces. Instead, training schemes are offered as long as 
there is still room in the fixed budget. Private initiative is only allowed within the narrow 
borders drawn by the bureaucracy of the labour office. 
An employability insurance system that relies on market forces is easy to conceive. To 
sketch an extreme position, today’s mandatory public unemployment insurance could be 
replaced by a mandatory private employability insurance system. The system should be 
mandatory to avoid myopic or free-rider behavior. Upon joining the labour force, individuals 
enter an employability insurance contract with a private insurer. If these individuals become 
unemployed during their career, two cases may arise. First, the individual is employable. In 
this case, the insurer pays a specified transfer to provide the unemployed with the means to 
search for a new position. Second, the individual has lost his employability, for example, due 
to structural change of the production process. In this case, the insurer pays for the training 
required to regain employability. The particular type of training will depend on the skills the 
individual possesses, his ability to acquire new skills, and the particular skills demanded by 
firms. Determining the type of training can be left to the unemployed and the insurer who 
could cooperate with temporary staff firms or private job placement firms that have superior 
information on the current composition of labour demand. 
In order to revive the adjustment flexibility, i.e. above all the flexibility of the wage 
structure, of the German labour market to external shocks, several tasks are on the economic 
policy agenda. Firstly, with respect to wage bargaining, the main political task is to appraise 
the conflict between the protection of the employed and the discrimination of the 
unemployed. The most appropriate solution of this conflict is to allow some decentralized 
autonomy in the collective labour contract. A legal redefinition of the Günstigkeitsprinzip   18
should provide that individual employees are allowed to deviate from the collective contract, 
if this deviation makes their jobs more secure, e.g., due to a commitment of the employer not 
to lay off workers in the near future. Moreover, a reform of  the Workers Council Constitution 
Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) should enable the employees of a firm to deviate from the 
collective contract as a group, if a qualified majority of two thirds of the employees vote in 
favour of a deviation. 
Secondly, incentives to decrease the unusual high reservation wages of unemployed persons 
in Germany and, as a consequence, the implicit minimum wage floor in the German labour 
market, should be provided by an appropriate reform of the unemployment benefits systems. 
With respect to unemployment benefits of type I, many observers propose to reduce the 
maximum duration of benefits from currently 32 months to 12 months as it had been the case 
until the mid 1980s. This would still be twice as long as the duration in the United Kingdom 
and the United States. More radical proposals suggest a dual system model of private 
unemployment insurance that strengthens incentives for both employees as well as employers 
to react to market forces: employees pay an insurance premium according to their individual 
risk of becoming unemployed, employers a refundable premium according their firm’s 
individual employment record (Glismann and Schrader 2001). 
The most far-reaching proposal with regard to the unemployment benefits of type II is to 
terminate this benefit system. In this case, those unemployed who do not find a job and whose 
unemployment benefit of type I has expired would receive (lower) social welfare benefits. 
However, in a recent reform proposal, the German government advocates to continue 
transfers of type II, but proposes to define neediness more strictly and to reduce the benefits to 
a level somewhat above social welfare. 
Thirdly, the social welfare benefit system needs to be reformed in a way that increases the 
disparity between incomes in the lower segment of the labour market and social welfare   19
payments. A “smooth adjustment” approach would be to apply the existing criteria of 
eligibility for social welfare more strictly, especially with a view to the reduction of benefits 
in case of a refusal of a job-offer, or to de-link the annual increases in benefits from changes 
of the consumer price index. However, measures along these lines might only lead to a 
psychological rather than a real redefinition of the implicit wage floor in the German welfare 
system. A more results-oriented approach would be to reduce the level of social welfare for 
those who are able to work but lack employability (i.e. to leave social welfare for the sick and 
elderly untouched) and at the same time to strengthen the incentives to accept low-wage jobs 
in the lower segment of the labour market for those that are able to find a job by gradually 
phasing out social welfare with increasing earned income as it is the case in the US Earned 
Income Tax Credit and the UK Family Tax Credit (Siebert 2003). This double-sided approach 
of reducing social benefits and granting wage subsidies might contribute to correct the false 
incentives that are being set in the German welfare benefit system. 
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FIGURE 3 



































Source: See Table 1. Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 16, Reihe 2 (various issues). Authors’ calculations. 
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FIGURE 4 
Relative Employment and Relative Wage of low-skilled Employees in German 
Manufacturing Industries 1970–1995 
 








Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 16, Reihe 2 (various issues). Authors’ calculations. 
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TABLE 1 









Intermediate Goods  –0.07 –0.23 –0.12 –0.70 
  (–0.20) (–1.27) (–1.95+) (–3.57**) 
      
Petroleum  Refining  0.49 1.02 2.88 0.51 
 (0.28)  (1.58)  (7.00**)  (0.31) 
      
Stone Goods  1.31  0.46  –0.26  0.34 
 (9.46**)  (2.89**)  (–0.84)  (6.47**) 
      
Iron  and  Steel  –0.76 –1.55 –2.51 –1.38 
  (–5.66**) (–10.16**)  (–5.15**) (–6.11**) 
      
Non-metallic  Mineral  Products  –0.41 –1.59 –1.27 –1.39 
 (–1.04)  (–4.47**)  (–2.19*)  (–4.60**) 
      
Foundries –0.68  0.88  0.71  –0.54 
 (–1.91+) (13.48**)  (5.76**) (–3.32**) 
      
Drawing Mills, Cold rolling Mills  –0.65  –0.50  –0.37  –1.30 
  (–6.62**) (–4.18**) (–6.23**) (–8.90**) 
      
Chemical  Goods  –0.17 –0.66 –1.38 –0.60 
  (–1.28)  (–4.20**) (–9.15**) (–4.88**) 
      
Wood 0.27  –0.99  –1.23  0.44 
 (1.86+) (–6.00**)  (–4.16**)  (0.99) 
      
Pulp,  Paper,  Paperboard  –0.02 –0.92 –1.36 –0.66 
  (–0.07)  (–2.74**) (–3.25**) (–2.39**) 
      
Foundries –0.30  0.74  0.18  –0.68 
 (–1.36)  (4.23**)  (1.07)  (–6.41**) 
      
Investment Goods  –0.13 0.30 0.06 0.41 
 (–0.42)  (3.65**)  (0.96)  (5.01**) 
      
Metal  Products  1.18 1.01 0.89 1.00 
 (5.22**)  (10.22**)  (6.41**)  (9.97**) 
      
Machinery  1.13 1.26 1.30 1.17 
  (4.57**)  (19.41**) (27.08**) (10.41**) 
      
Road  Vehicles  0.62 0.84 0.29 0.81 
 (1.82+) (9.54**)  (3.89**)  (11.94**) 
      
Shipbuilding ·  ·  0.43  · 
 ·  ·  (2.07**)  · 
        
Aircraft, Aerospace  ·  ·  0.61  · 
 ·  ·  (1.46)  · 
      
Electronical  Engineering  –1.13 –0.93 –1.45 –0.74 
  (–3.19**) (–6.55**) (–22.34**)  (–4.36**) 
        30
Precision  Mechanics,  Optics  –0.89 0.14 0.03 0.30 
  (–2.97**)  (1.14) (0.44) (1.85+) 
      
Mechanical  Engineering  0.33 0.50 0.34 0.84 
 (1.25)  (13.39**)  (8.08**)  (14.55**) 
      
Office Machines, Data Processing   –2.79  –4.43  –8.23  –5.09 
Equipment  (–4.04**)  (–19.21**) (–22.03**) (–36.03**) 
      
Consumer Goods  0.29 0.25 0.11 0.01 
  (2.63**) (4.65**) (2.58*)  (0.10) 
      
Musical  Instruments,  Toys  2.56 1.42 1.17 0.52 
  (9.66**) (7.53**) (3.99**) (1.64) 
      
Precision  Ceramics  1.13 0.94 0.97 1.59 
  (3.48**)  (10.24**) (16.75**) (14.33**) 
      
Glass  Products  0.06 –0.50 –1.52 –0.04 
 (0.28)  (–8.75**)  (–26.53**)  (–0.25) 
      
Wood  Products  1.03 1.17 1.58 1.14 
 (7.57**)  (7.24**)  (10.58**)  (4.78**) 
      
Paper and Paperboard Products  –0.25  0.38  0.39  –0.10 
 (–2.42*)  (3.83**)  (5.32**)  (–1.40) 
      
Printing  Products  0.21 0.74 0.56 0.88 
  (1.00)  (15.96**) (11.80**) (15.85**) 
      
Plastic  Products  –0.61 –0.24 –0.78 –0.61 
  (–3.33**) (–3.45**) (–4.93**) (–9.58**) 
      
Leather  Products,  Footwear  1.08 0.88 0.66 0.66 
 (6.12**)  (12.46**)  (4.83**)  (7.16**) 
      
Textiles  –0.25 –0.60 –1.32 –0.94 
 (–1.81+) (–6.86**)  (–19.96**)  (–5.43**) 
      
Wearing Apparel  0.04  0.11  –0.25  0.53 
 (0.28)  (0.95)  (–13.84**)  (3.41**) 
      
Food, Beverages, Tobacco  –1.27 –0.84  0.30 –1.21 
 (–7.59**)  (–13.59**)  (2.10*)  (–10.94**) 
Note: 
a Estimation coefficients expressed as percentage points a year. The entire regression equations can be 
obtained on request from the authors. Autocorrelation consistent t-values according to Newey-West are 
given in brackets.  +, *, ** indicates the significance of the coefficients at the 10-, 5-, 1-percent level, 
respectively. 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 17, Reihe 2 and Reihe 8 (various issues). Statistisches 
Bundesamt, Fachserie 18, Reihe 1 (various issues). Authors’ calculations. 
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TABLE 2 
Skill Composition
a and Price Trends
b in German Manufacturing Industries 1970–1995 (Partial 
Correlation Coefficients) 
 IMP  SP  VAP  EXP 
SHLE70 –0.232  –0.288  –0.303  –0.342+ 
SHLE75 –0.096  –0.132  –0.136  –0.209 
SHLE80 –0.064  –0.078  –0.087  –0.137 
SHLE85 –0.007  –0.034  –0.045  –0.102 
SHLE90 0.013  0.037  0.042  –0.080 
SHLE95 0.036  0.039  0.073  –0.054 
Notes: 
a Measured as share of low-skilled employees (SHLE) in total employment. 
b IMP: trend in import prices; SP: trend in supplier prices; VAP: trend in value-added prices; 
EXP: trend in export prices. 
+ indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10-percent level. 
Source: See Table 1 and Figure 2. Authors’ calculations. 
 
TABLE 3 








Constant Exogenous  Variablesc  R





EFFPRO85 2,14 13,81  SHLE85     0,13 5,07*  3,71
d  7,64e 
 (0,69)  (2,25*)               
 [0,53]  [1,67]               
                  
EFFPRO85 –1,55  20,53  SHLE85 13,07  DUMLRB 0,28 6,14* 2,42
d  8,66e 
 (–0,49)  (3,30**)    (2,49*)          
 [–0,54]  [3,13**]    [6,34**]          
Notes: 
a  cross section analysis; t-values are given in () brackets, heteroskedasticity consistent t-values 
according to White in [] brackets; *, ** indicates the 5- and 1-percent significance level, respectively.  
b EFFPRO: effective protection rate.  
c SHLE: share of low-skilled employees in total employment. DUMLRB: dummy variable (aircraft and 
aerospace = 1). 
d The residuals of the estimation function are normally distributed. 
e The residuals of the estimation function are heteroskedastic. 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 16, Reihe 2 (various issues). Heitger and Stehn (1990). 
Authors’ calculations.   32
TABLE 4 
Determinants of Relative Demand for low-skilled Employees in German Manufacturing 
Industries 1970–1995
a 
Exogenous Variables  Estimation Coefficient  t–Test 
    
Relative Wage of low-skilled Workersb –1,4052  (–6,46**) 
    
Fixed Effects     
    
Cross-section Specific Effects (‘Technical Change’)     
Petroleum Refining  –0,0415  (–20,30**) 
Stone Goods  –0,0112  (–5,65**) 
Iron and Steel  –0,0445  (–22,36**) 
Non-metallic Mineral Products –0,0168  (–8,40**) 
Foundries –0,0163  (–8,16**) 
Drawing Mills, Cold rolling Mills  –0,0191  (–9,31**) 
Chemical Goods  –0,0257  (–12,93**) 
Wood –0,0074  (–3,71**) 
Pulp, Paper, Paperboard  –0,0194  (–8,92**) 
Rubber Goods  0,0141  (6,80**) 
Metal Products  –0,0219  (–10,78**) 
Machinery –0,0238  (–11,55**) 
Road Vehicles  0,0084  (4,01**) 
Shipbuilding –0,0383  (–18,12**) 
Aircraft, Aerospace  –0,0449  (–20,15**) 
Electronical Engineering  –0,0151  (–7,16**) 
Precision Mechanics, Optics  –0,0123  (–5,71**) 
Mechanical Engineering  –0,0137  (–6,57**) 
Office Machines, Data Processing Equipment  –0,0184  (–7,12**) 
Musical Instruments, Toys  –0,0006  (–0,25) 
Precision Ceramics  0,0085  (4,08**) 
Glass Products  –0,0191  (–9,50**) 
Wood Products  0,0118  (5,43**) 
Paper and Paperboard Products  –0,0174  (–7,93**) 
Printing Products  0,0030  (1,38) 
Plastic Products  –0,0134  (–6,45**) 
Leather Products, Footwear  0,0074  (3,66**) 
Textiles –0,0055  (–2,65**) 
Wearing Apparel  –0,0007  (–0,31) 









a  Panel analysis including cross-section specific effects (‘technological change’). Endogenous 
Variable: relative employment of low-skilled employees compared to high-skilled employees; ** 
indicates the 1-percent significance level. 
b Measured as share of wages of low-skilled employees in wages of high-skilled employees. 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 16, Reihe 2 (various issues). DIW (1995). Authors’ 
calculations. 
 